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HATCHING A PLAN TOWARDS COMPREHENSIVE
REGULATIONS IN EGG DONATION
INTRODUCTION
Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ART) provide thousands of
infertile couples in the United States with the ability to conceive and
raise a child of their own.1  On the other side of ART lie the young
women needed to provide oocytes, or eggs, to couples who cannot
produce their own.  Donors are often recruited by private fertility
clinics and egg brokers hired by the recipient couples to locate donors
with certain attributes who then refer donors to ART clinics where
their eggs are retrieved.2  There are rampant ethical concerns related
to coercion in donor recruitment, commodification of body materials,
and biases that can negatively influence risk disclosure and the medi-
cal retrieval of eggs.  Despite these ethical concerns and inherent
medical risks present in the donation process, the only federal laws
concerning egg donation merely require reporting success rates of
ART treatments and screening the eggs for communicable diseases,
meaning that there are no federal regulations that operate to protect
egg donors from the strong financial incentives within this multi-bil-
lion dollar private industry.3  Although fertility clinics and physicians
are “self-regulated” under guidelines from professional societies,
these guidelines are not mandatory and are hardly enforced.4  A mi-
nority of states that allow egg donation have made efforts to pass laws
1. Saswati Sunderam et al., Assisted Reproductive Technology Surveillance—United States,
2010, 62 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP., Dec. 6, 2013, at 9.
2. See John A. Robertson, Commerce and Regulation in the Assisted Reproduction Industry,
85 TEX. L. REV. 665, 691–92 (2007) (reviewing DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: HOW
MONEY, SCIENCE, AND POLITICS DRIVE THE COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION (2006)) (describing the
business model of an embryo bank in San Antonio, Texas); Julie L. Sauer, Competing Interests
and Gamete Donation: The Case for Anonymity, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 919, 926 (2009).
3. Andrea Preisler, Student Article, Assisted Reproductive Technology: The Dangers of an
Unregulated Market and the Need for Reform, 15 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 213, 213 (2013);
see Michelle Bercovici, Biotechnology Beyond the Embryo: Science, Ethics, and Responsible Reg-
ulation of Egg Donation To Protect Women’s Rights, 29 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 193, 193 (2008);
see also Lucy Frith & Eric Blyth, Assisted Reproductive Technology in the USA: Is More Regula-
tion Needed?, 29 REPRODUCTIVE BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 516, 517 (2014) (arguing that more com-
prehensive oversight is needed); Brittany L. Marvin, Note, Regulating the Procurement of
Female Gametes: Donors’ Health and Safety, 16 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 119 (2011).
4. Kitty L. Cone, Note, Family Law—Egg Donation and Stem Cell Research—Eggs for Sale:
The Scrambled State of Legislation in the Human Egg Market, 35 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV.
189, 191–92 (2012).
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that help protect egg donors, but the majority of states fail to provide
adequate safeguards and supervision in this unique industry.5
This Comment argues that the current federal laws are not only in-
adequate to supervise egg donation, but that they may contribute to
the existing problems in the system’s structure.6  Federal action is nec-
essary for any reforms to occur in the United States.  In the end, any
solution to these issues must be balanced to account for the interests
of all the parties involved in ART.  By shifting the current incentive
structure within the industry, which currently emphasizes successful
pregnancies and accordingly preferential treatment of the recipient
couple, greater emphasis could be placed on the well-being of the do-
nor.7  This could be accomplished by increasing insurance coverage of
ART, tying reimbursement to certification by either professional as-
sociations or state agencies, and compliance with new regulations.8
Expansion of the current reporting requirements to include more in-
formation on donors would aid in understanding risks in egg donation,
the detection of unprofessional clinics, and forcing physicians to inter-
nalize their predatory and aggressive practices toward egg donors.9
Part II of this Comment provides a background of the ART indus-
try and the risks it poses to egg donors.10  It further explains the cur-
rent ART regulations in the United States at the federal and state
levels.11  Part III discusses the deficiencies in the current regulatory
scheme and argues that the current federal reporting requirements not
only fail to provide any protection for donors but also increase the
ethical risks by incentivizing high fertility success rates.12  This Com-
ment argues that federal action is necessary to spur more states into
regulating egg donation, and suggests a solution to these biases
through increased insurance coverage of ART and expansions to the
current federal reporting requirements.13  Section IV discusses the im-
plications of these suggested changes and examines them in light of
existing barriers to reforming ART regulation.14  Section V concludes
that expanding the current federal reporting requirements and tying
5. See infra notes 125–38 and accompanying text, for a further discussion of state regulation of R
egg donations.
6. See infra notes 146–81 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of uniform regulation of R
ART in the United States).
7. See infra notes 182–84 and accompanying text. R
8. See infra notes 185–89 and accompanying text. R
9. See infra notes 192–200 and accompanying text. R
10. See infra notes 17–99 and accompanying text. R
11. See infra notes 100–44 and accompanying text. R
12. See infra notes 146–201 and accompanying text. R
13. See infra notes 182–201 and accompanying text. R
14. See infra notes 210–50 and accompanying text. R
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insurance coverage to compliance with those requirements and pro-
fessional standards would address the current ethical risks that exist in
the industry in a balanced manner.15
II. BACKGROUND
This Part provides a background on ART generally and then moves
to a discussion regarding the egg donation process and the medical
risks of egg donation.  An explanation of the structure of the ART
industry and the parties involved is then discussed, leading to the ethi-
cal issues relating to egg donors presented by the industry and the
regulations pertaining to ART in the United States.  All of the issues
presented supra16 have spawned from the emergence and prolifera-
tion of ART.
A. The ART Industry and Egg Donors
Sixty-two million U.S. women of childbearing age are infertile,17
and 12%, or 7.4 million, of those women will seek infertility services
during their lives;18 consequently, ART represents a multi-billion dol-
lar industry in the United States19 that has been steadily growing.20
There are many parties holding stake in this lucrative private health
sector: infertile couples who finance the procedures, fertility clinics
who perform the ART procedures, egg brokers who seek out desira-
ble gamete donors and connect them with infertile patients, pharma-
ceutical companies who manufacture the drugs needed for ovulation
cycles, and, lastly, sperm or egg donors.21  Despite the inherent risks
involved in the donation process, such as blood clots or future infertil-
15. See infra notes 251–258 and accompanying text. R
16. supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text. R
17. NAT’L CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 2012 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY: FERTILITY CLINIC SUCCESS RATES REPORT 3 (2014) [hereinafter 2012 CLINIC
SUCCESS RATES REPORT].  The American Society for Reproductive Medicine defines infertility
as “the failure to achieve a successful pregnancy after 12 months or more of appropriate, timed
unprotected intercourse or therapeutic donor insemination.”  Practice Comm. of the Am. Soc’y
for Reproductive Med., Definitions of Infertility and Recurrent Pregnancy Loss: A Committee
Opinion, 99 FERTILITY & STERILITY 63, 63 (2013) [hereinafter ASRM, Definitions of Infertility].
18. 2012 CLINIC SUCCESS RATES REPORT, supra note 17 at 3. R
19. Marvin, supra note 3, at 120. R
20. Sunderam et al., supra note 1, at 2. R
21. See infra notes 82–99 and accompanying text (discussing the different roles and interests R
of these three parties, which interact to create conflicts of interests raising ethical concerns).
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ity,22 millions of women donate their eggs each year for a cost of any-
where from $5,000 up to $20,000 per cycle.23
ART is a general term that covers a variety of fertility treatments,
and new cutting-edge treatments are being developed each year,
which, in turn, introduce new issues of bioethics.24  To understand the
issues presented by ART and, specifically, egg donation, a general un-
derstanding of both is necessary.  This subsection explains the basics
of ART in general, the egg donation process, and the medical risks of
egg donation.
1. The ABCs of ART
According to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC), ART includes any fertility treatments in which either human
eggs or embryos are handled.25  Fertility treatments provide couples
who are unable to conceive naturally with a potential means for
achieving pregnancy.26  The main ART procedure is in vitro fertiliza-
tion (IVF).27  IVF involves extracting the eggs from either a woman
seeking infertility treatment or an egg donor, fertilizing the retrieved
eggs in a laboratory, and then transferring the resulting embryos into
22. See Bercovici, supra note 3, at 195 (discussing ovarian hyperstimulation, which is the most R
prominent and threatening risk of hyperstimulation).
23. Although it is impossible to know exactly how much donors are compensated, most re-
ports estimate average compensations between $5,000 and $10,000. See Marvin, supra note 3, at R
128–30 (examining advertisements in newspapers or produced by fertility clinics).
24. See, e.g., Paul R. Brezina & Yulian Zhao, The Ethical, Legal, and Social Issues Impacted
by Modern Assisted Reproductive Technologies, OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY INT’L (2012);
WORLD HEALTH ORG., CURRENT PRACTICES AND CONTROVERSIES IN ASSISTED REPRODUC-
TION (Effy Vayena et al. eds., 2002).
25. NAT’L CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 2013 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY: FERTILITY CLINIC SUCCESS RATES REPORT 3 (2015) [hereinafter 2013 CLINIC
SUCCESS RATES REPORT]. This is the definition employed by the CDC in its annual reports. See
id.  An egg is the female reproductive cell, also called an oocyte or ovum. Id. at 529.
26. Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reproductive Med., Using Family Members as Gamete
Donors or Surrogates, 98 FERTILITY & STERILITY 797, 797 (2012).  Couples often prefer ART
over adoption due to their desire to have children possessing their own genetics. See generally
Kenneth Baum, Golden Eggs: Towards the Rational Regulation of Oocyte Donation, 2001 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 107, 115 (discussing that artificial insemination allows parents to maintain genetic and
gestational ties to the offspring).  In certain instances, adoption might even be more costly than
utilizing infertility treatments. See Geoff Williams, The Cost of Adoption, U.S. NEWS: MONEY
(Oct. 2, 2014, 9:38 AM), http://money.usnews.com/money/personal-finance/articles/2014/10/02/
the-cost-of-adoption.  Assisted reproductive technologies are also used to implant a couple’s, or
donor’s, sperm, egg, or embryo into another woman as a surrogate. Ethics Comm. of the Am.
Soc’y for Reproductive Med., supra note 26, at 797.  Surrogacy and donor sperm, eggs, or em- R
bryos are often necessary for same-sex couples to have children with their own genetics.  John A.
Robertson, Gay and Lesbian Access to Assisted Reproductive Technology, 55 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 323, 324–25 (2004).
27. 2012 CLINIC SUCCESS RATES REPORT, supra note 18, at 3. R
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the uterus via the cervix of either the woman seeking treatment or a
designated surrogate who will carry the fetus during the pregnancy.28
A woman may use her own eggs for IVF treatments, but oftentimes
infertility stems from issues with her own eggs, requiring her to obtain
eggs from an oocyte donor.29  These donors are generally young
women because younger eggs have a higher chance of fertility.30  Do-
nors are often targeted from universities or selected based on personal
traits, such as race, intelligence, height, or any type of preferred ap-
pearance.31  The potential of financial coercion, when combined with
the large amounts of compensation offered, may raise ethical concerns
regarding the commodification of body materials.32
Women may also donate eggs to be used for stem cell research.33
Due to the controversial nature of stem cell research, there are more
laws and restrictions governing the retrieval, handling, and use of eggs
28. REPROD. HEALTH TECHNOLOGIES PROJECT, OVARIAN STIMULATION AND EGG RE-
TRIEVAL: OVERVIEW & ISSUES TO CONSIDER 1–2 & tbl.1 (2009), http://www.rhtp.org/fertility/
assisted/documents/RHTP-OvarianStimulationandEggRetrievalPaperUpdated.pdf.  Although
there are other popular ART treatments, IVF is used as the basis for this Comment.  The discus-
sions regarding egg donation for fertility treatment in this Comment are applicable to other
ART treatments that require anonymous donors.
29. NAT’L CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 2013 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY: NATIONAL SUMMARY REPORT 12 (2015); N.Y. TASK FORCE ON LIFE & THE LAW,
THINKING OF BECOMING AN EGG DONOR?: GET THE FACTS BEFORE YOU DECIDE 12 (Apr.
2009) [hereinafter N.Y. EGG DONOR FACTS], http://www.health.ny.gov/publications/1127.pdf.
This Comment uses the term “donors” to refer to women who are donating eggs and are not the
ones who ultimately will keep the child.  This Comment uses the term “Recipients” to refer to
the person who is financing the procedures to make a child, regardless of whether the recipient
carries the child to birth or contracts a surrogate to do it.
30. Marvin, supra note 3, at 128 (estimating that 75% of all U.S. egg donors are college stu- R
dents).  The typical donor age ranges from twenty-one to thirty-five. N.Y. EGG DONOR FACTS,
supra note 29, at 5.  The lower limit of eighteen represents the ability to legally contract for R
donation. Id.  The upper limit of thirty-five is set due to increase risks involved in responses to
the stimulation drugs. Id.
31. Marvin, supra note 3, at 128. R
32. See Justine Durrell, Women’s Eggs: Exceptional Endings, 22 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 187,
189 (2011) (“The issues of health risks and informed consent cannot be divorced from the con-
cerns of financial compensation.”); Sauer, supra note 2, at 927 n.58 (citing Ethics Comm. of the R
Am Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Financial Compensation of Oocyte Donors: A Committee Report, 88
FERTILITY & STERILITY 305, 306 (2007)).
33. M. Elliot Neal, Note, Protecting Women: Preserving Autonomy in the Commodification of
Motherhood, 17 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 611, 617 (2011). Stem cells are undifferentiated
cells produced in the early stages of embryos that can multiply and produce specific differenti-
ated cells.  Stephen R. Munzer, How To Integrate Administrative Law and Tort Law: The Regu-
lation of Stem Cell Products, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 743, 746–77 (2012).  These cells can be used in a
variety of therapies and treatments, which ultimately end in the destruction of the embryos.
Radhika Rao, Coercion, Commercialization, and Commodification: The Ethics of Compensation
for Egg Donors in Stem Cell Research, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1055, 1055 (2014).
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when they are retrieved for stem cell research.34  Almost every state
has legislation concerning the donation and use of eggs when they are
intended to create embryos for stem cell use.35  Although the retrieval
procedures and the eggs are virtually identical, the increased regula-
tion of stem cell research provides donors with more protections and
safeguards from predatory industry practices.36  Despite the imbal-
ance in regulation and discussion between the two uses of eggs, the
majority of eggs donated in the United States are from anonymous
donors who are compensated for their eggs.37  Although egg donation
is often required in ART treatments, it remains a time-intensive, inva-
sive, and complicated process.
2. The Egg Donation Process
The ART treatments, including donation and implantation, are per-
formed in cycles and are composed of several stages.38  Donation cy-
cles typically last three weeks and involve ovarian stimulation and
surgical retrieval of the eggs,39 a drug process carrying acute and long-
term risks.40
The donation process begins with the recruitment and selection of
the donor.41  Donors are often recruited through online or print ad-
vertisements offering monetary compensation in exchange for their
eggs.42  A fertility clinic or a third-party agency, generally referred to
as an “egg broker” who matches the recipients and donors with the
traits they seek and who facilitates parts of the transaction, conducts
34. See generally Neal, supra note 33 at 617–18 (discussing the controversy surrounding stem R
cell research).
35. Cone, supra note 4, at 217 app. A.  Many states outright ban the use of embryos for stem R
cell research, and most states that do allow such research expressly ban compensating donors for
donating eggs.  Diana M. Santos, Compensation for Egg Donations to Stem Cell Research: Coer-
cion or Choice?, 2 HEALTH L. & POL’Y BRIEF 82, 82 (2013); See Cone, supra note 4, at 217 app. R
A.; Embryonic and Fetal Research Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/
research/health/embryonic-and-fetal-research-laws.aspx (last updated Jan. 1, 2016);
36. Cone, supra note 4, at 208. R
37. N.Y. EGG DONOR FACTS, supra note 29, at 13. R
38. REPROD. HEALTH TECHNOLOGIES PROJECT, supra note 28, at 2. R
39. Id.
40. Id. at 3–5. See infra notes 55–65 and accompanying text, for a discussion of the medical R
risks.
41. Baum, supra note 26, at 116. R
42. Aaron D. Levine, Self-Regulation, Compensation, and the Ethical Recruitment of Oocyte
Donors, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.–Apr. 2010, at 29, 35.  These advertisements often do not
disclose risks involved in the donation process.  Hillary B. Alberta et al., Risk Disclosure and the
Recruitment of Oocyte Donors: Are Advertisers Telling the Full Story?, 42 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
232, 233–34.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-4\DPL404.txt unknown Seq: 7 11-OCT-16 7:43
2016] REGULATIONS IN EGG DONATION 1289
the recruitment process.43  The “egg market” has expanded online
into the form of social databases akin to Facebook or dating websites
that match donors and recipients.44
Once the donors are selected, they are screened by a fertility clinic
for medical risks, communicable diseases, and psychological risks.45
According to the American Society for Reproductive Medicine
(ASRM) and other professional guidelines, donors must go through
the informed consent process and be made fully aware of the entire
donation procedure, including the risks involved.46  Once donors pro-
vide their informed consent and are properly screened and approved
for donation, they begin the “controlled hyperstimulation” process of
the cycle.47
“Controlled hyperstimulation” involves a three-week cycle of hor-
mone therapy whereby three sets of hormones are administered al-
most daily to stimulate the donor’s ovaries into producing many eggs
at one time.48  The ASRM estimates that the donor will spend almost
43. Kari L. Karsjens, Boutique Egg Donations: A New Form of Racism and Patriarchy, 5
DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 57, 65 (2002).
44. Bercovici, supra note 3, at 196–97; Sauer, supra note 2, at 951 n.202 (citing THE DONOR R
SIBLING REGISTRY, http://www.donorsiblingregistry.com/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2016)).
45. N.Y. EGG DONOR FACTS, supra note 29, at 8–10.  “Common complaints from donors dur- R
ing the donation process include hormone injections, egg retrieval pain, anxiety, and mood sw-
ings.  Donors also reported worrying about potential medical and fertility consequences from
their donations.”  Durrell, supra note 32, at 203 (footnotes omitted). R
46. Durrell, supra note 32, at 217.  Although ASRM recommends that physicians disclose fi- R
nancial interests related to the donation process when eggs will be used for research purposes,
they do not have similarly explicit recommendations when the eggs are being retrieved for ART
purposes.  Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Informed Consent and the Use of
Gametes and Embryos for Research: A Committee Opinion, 101 FERTILITY & STERILITY 332, 333
(2014) (“IVF facility and research investigators should disclose all conflicts of interests to the
donors, including but not limited to financial conflicts of interest.”); Ethics Comm. of the Am.
Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Donating Embryos for Human Embryonic Stem Cell (hESC) Research:
A Committee Opinion, 100 FERTILITY & STERILITY 935, 935 (2013) (“Patients should be in-
formed of financial incentives, if any, that the investigator/physician or the institution/organiza-
tion has in the research.”).  Financial interests can undermine informed consent. See, e.g.,
Valerie K. Blake et al., Conflicts of Interest and Effective Oversight of Assisted Reproduction
Using Donated Oocytes, J.L. MED. & ETHICS 410, at 411 (2015); Durrell, supra note 32, at 215, R
220–21; Sonia M. Suter, Giving in to Baby Markets: Regulation Without Prohibition, 16 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 217, 238–40 (2009); Cone, supra note 4, at 202. R
47. See generally N.Y. EGG DONOR FACTS, supra note 29, at 15–16 (describing the process of R
controlled hyperstimulation).
48. REPROD. HEALTH TECHNOLOGIES PROJECT, supra note 28, at 2 & tbl.1. There are many R
different brands and types of hormone inducing drugs utilized in ovarian hyperstimulation. Id.
at 2 tbl.1.  The health care provider performing the retrieval usually selects which one to admin-
ister based on “various factors, including age, ovarian responsiveness and the purpose of the egg
retrieval.” Id. at 2.  There are three stages involved in hyperstimulation: (1) synthetic gonado-
tropin-releasing hormones are administered to temporarily suppress regular ovarian function in
order to have the donor reach baseline hormone levels; (2) stimulate the pituitary gland to pro-
duce gonadotropins, which stimulate the ovaries to mature and release multiple follicles; and (3)
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-4\DPL404.txt unknown Seq: 8 11-OCT-16 7:43
1290 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:1283
fifty-six hours in the clinic during the hyperstimulation process.49  Al-
though women may donate eggs without undergoing hyperstimulation
by donating the one egg naturally released during a menstrual cycle,50
it is preferable to both the women seeking fertility treatment and the
fertility clinics to remove multiple eggs per cycle and implant as many
eggs as possible due to the high costs and time commitment involved
in each cycle.51  Despite fertility professionals’ desires to maximize fi-
nancial efficiency and increase the chances of fertility,52 the risks from
donating increase exponentially when more eggs are retrieved.53
Once the eggs are fully matured from the final hormone in the hyper-
stimulation process, they must be physically retrieved from the ova-
rian follicle within twenty-four to thirty-six hours using an ultrasound-
guided needle.54  Despite the proliferation of ART and egg donation,
egg donation can present serious medical risks to egg donors.
3. The Medical Risks
It is well documented that there are risks involved in both the
hyperstimulation and the surgical egg retrieval, yet there are no com-
prehensive studies detailing the likelihood of risks occurring because
there is no source of objective data on the long-term risks and out-
comes in egg donation.55  While the physical extraction process of the
eggs may seem extreme, it is minimally invasive compared to the in-
tense and time-consuming hormone process.56  Both procedures can
administer human gonadotropin to stimulate the final maturation of the egg triggering ovulation
while simultaneously triggering progesterone after egg retrieval to prepare the uterus for im-
plantation. Id.
49. Id. at 3.
50. Id. at 2–3.
51. See id. at 1–3.
52. Cone, supra note 4, at 202. R
53. Am. Soc’y Reproductive Med., Ovarian Hyperstimulation Syndrome, 90 FERTILITY & STE-
RILITY S118, S118 (2008); Sesh Kamal Sunkara et al., Association Between The Number of Eggs
and Live Birth in IVF Treatment: An Analysis of 400 135 Treatment Cycles, HUM. REPROD.:
ADVANCE ACCESS, at 1744, (May 10, 2011).  Implanting multiple eggs into recipients may result
in multiple simultaneous births, which can create extreme dangers in birthing.  Practice Comm.
of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med. & Practice Comm. of the Soc’y for Assisted Reprod. Tech.,
Criteria for a Number of Embryos to Transfer: A Committee Opinion, 99 FERTILITY & STERILITY
44, 44 (2013) [hereinafter ASRM, Criteria for a Number of Embryos to Transfer].
54. REPROD. HEALTH TECHNOLOGIES PROJECT, supra note 28, at 3.  “The process of egg ex- R
traction or ‘harvesting’ generally occurs when the woman is under light anesthesia.”  Bercovici,
supra note 3, at 195. R
55. See REPROD. HEALTH TECHNOLOGIES PROJECT, supra note 28, at 3, 7.  Because clinics R
and physicians are not required to report any post-egg retrieval complications, or even follow up
with donors at all, there is no data collected on post-donation complications.  The only data on
risks come from case studies or self-reported studies.  See infra notes 192–200 and accompanying R
text, for an analysis on data and reporting.
56. Bercovici, supra note 3, at 195. R
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result in minor and severe complications that may arise acutely or de-
velop over time.57
One of the most common risks associated with egg donation is ova-
rian hyperstimulation syndrome (OHSS), which is an “exaggerated re-
sponse” to the third step of controlled hyperstimulation in which the
human hormone gonadotropin is administered to trigger the ovula-
tion.58  Most estimates suggest that a majority of women undergoing
controlled hyperstimulation will experience some mild symptoms of
OHSS.59  Surgical egg retrieval carries risks common to most surgical
procedures, such as bleeding, infection, complications, and adverse re-
actions to anesthetics.60
Aside from egg retrieval’s acute risks that may develop, egg re-
trieval may carry serious long-term risks as well.61  The egg retrieval
process is potentially associated with increased risks of breast, ova-
rian, and endometrial cancers, as well as infertility.62  Certain psycho-
logical risks may arise from the egg donation process, including, but
not limited to: (1) second thoughts in donating; (2) the revelation of
previously unknown medical conditions that disqualify them from do-
nating; or (3) donors’ concerns about the future use of their eggs.63
57. See id. at 194–95.
58. See REPROD. HEALTH TECHNOLOGIES PROJECT, supra note 28, at 3 (defining “OHSS” as R
“a condition following administration of human chronic gonadotropin (hGC) to trigger ovula-
tion”); Practice Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Ovarian Hyperstimulation Syn-
drome, 90 FERTILITY & STERILITY S118, S118 (Supp. 2008) (defining “OHSS” as “an
exaggerated response to ovulation induction therapy”).  OHSS carries a variety of symptoms
from swelling of the ovaries, mild to severe abdominal pain, vomiting, nausea, and dehydration.
Bercovici, supra note 3, at 195.  It can also cause very serious problems, including “clotting disor- R
ders, renal failure, and ovarian twisting.” REPROD. HEALTH TECHNOLOGIES PROJECT, supra
note 28, at 3. R
59. See, e.g., REPROD. HEALTH TECHNOLOGIES PROJECT, supra note 28, at 4 (citing LINDA R
GIUDICE ET AL, ASSESSING THE MEDICAL RISKS OF HUMAN OOCYTE DONATION FOR STEM
CELL RESEARCH: WORKSHOP REPORT 18 (2007)).  The exact rates of OHSS are impossible to
know because all previous studies have utilized retrospective methods, and no follow up infor-
mation was recorded on donors.  One in ten women have been estimated to experience abdomi-
nal or pelvic pain.  Id.  OHSS can occur two to seven days after the third step of
hyperstimulation or later (around twelve to seventeen days after the third stage). Id.  Later
occurrences tend to bring more severe complications. Id. Conservative estimates suggest that
the morbidity rate of women who develop serious OHSS symptoms is one in every 500,000 egg
donation cycles; however, data is vulnerable to confounding variables, because women who have
their own eggs retrieved for their own IVF procedures subsequently become pregnant, which
carries its own increased risks of blood clots. Id.
60. The Medical Procedure of Egg Donation, EGG DONOR INFO. PROJECT, https://
web.stanford.edu/class/siw198q/websites/eggdonor/procedures.html (last updated June 5, 2002).
61. Amy L. Boutelle, Donor Motivations, Associated Risks and Ethical Considerations of Oo-
cyte Donation, 18 NURSING FOR WOMEN’S HEALTH 112, 117–18 (2014).
62. Id.; Durrell, supra note 32, at 188; Cone, supra note 4, at 200–01. R
63. LINDA GIUDICE ET AL., supra note 59 at 41–49. R
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The medical risks and compensation to egg donors underscore con-
cerns that the industry’s structure and relation of the parties involved
may present conflicts of interests and biases that could cause egg do-
nors to be exposed to subpar treatment from those parties, specifically
physicians.
B. System Structure, Interests, and Ethical Risks
In the United States, there are three general parties involved in the
ART and egg donation process: (1) recipients; (2) donors; and (3)
those involved in the industry.  Each of these parties has different in-
terests and goals based on their roles and position in the structure of
the U.S. egg market.64  Donors have either financial or altruistic moti-
vations in donating their eggs as well as concern with their own well-
being.65  Recipients will usually seek healthy donors with certain at-
tributes and clinics with high fertility rates and competitive prices on
fertility cycles.66  There are two types of industry parties that interact
with egg donors: those on the clinical side, such as fertility physicians
and the clinics that employ them, and third-party recruiters and egg
brokers.67  The clinics want to attract recipients to their services, keep
those recipients satisfied to retain their payments, and maximize and
maintain the fertility success rates that attract future customers.68
The different roles and interests of these three parties interact to
create conflicts of interests that raise ethical concerns.  Although ethi-
cal concerns arise in any commodification of bodily materials, they are
amplified by the financial incentives and motives that drive the largely
unsupervised side of the ART industry.69  The following Section de-
tails the ethical concerns with egg donation generally, the increased
risks of ethical issues presented by the industry’s structure, and the
incentives that drive the industry.
1. The Ethical Risks Surrounding ART
Almost every aspect of ART can be criticized on some sort of ethi-
cal ground,70 but there are specific concerns that accompany the egg
64. Hereinafter, “egg market” refers to the market for ART rather than stem cells.
65. See Boutelle, supra note 61, at 115. R
66. See id. at 114; Durrell, supra note 32, at 216 n.242; Preisler, supra note 3, at 226. R
67. Blake et al., supra note 46, at 411; Brenda Reddix-Smalls, Assessing the Market for Human R
Reproductive Tissue Alienability: Why Can We Sell Our Eggs but Not Our Livers?, 10 VAND. J.
ENT. & TECH. L. 643, 672 (2008).
68. Cone, supra note 4, at 202. R
69. Blake et al., supra note 46; Reddix-Smalls, supra note 67, at 650 n.18. R
70. Yehezkel Margalit et al., The New Frontier of Advanced Reproductive Technology:
Reevaluating Modern Legal Parenthood, 37 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 108, 108–09 (2014).
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donor’s situation.71  Some scholars view the compensation that donors
receive as a coercive monetary incentive.72  These concerns are ampli-
fied by the fact that the typical donor is a young woman in college
who is likely in need of money.73  This concern is evidenced by the
fact that most countries engaging in ART typically ban any monetary
compensation beyond direct costs.74  However, these bans can force
massive negative effects on the ART industry, such as severely reduc-
ing the supply of donor eggs, which can lead to black markets and
stifled innovation.75  The ASRM guidelines limit compensation, but
much evidence suggests that the guidelines are not widely adhered to
in many circumstances.76
Another ethical concern in egg donation is whether physicians ob-
tain informed consent from donors.77  To attain proper informed con-
sent, donors must be made fully aware of, and comprehend, all risks
and procedures involved in egg donation, and they must give their
consent to participate in these procedures.78  Because informed con-
71. Ina N. Cholst, Oocyte Donation and the Therapeutic Misconception, 99 FERTILITY & STE-
RILITY 1561, 1561–62 (2013).  One of the biggest ethical dilemmas in egg donation, is the fact
that no aspect of the entire procedure is medically necessary for the donors and, thus, the risks to
the donor will always outweigh any medical benefit she may receive from the procedure. Marvin,
supra note 3, at 127.  Some advertisements have offered as much as $50,000 to donors with R
specific physical, cultural, or personal characteristics; however, these are extremely rare. Ethics
Comm. of the Am Soc’y for Reprod. Med., supra note 32, at 306. R
72. See, e.g., Durrell, supra note 32, at 189–90; Lisa M. Luetkemeyer, Who’s Guarding the R
Henhouse and What Are They Doing with the Eggs (and Sperm)?; A Call for Increased Regula-
tion of Gamete Donation and Long-Term Tracking of Donor Gametes, 3 ST. LOUIS U. J.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 399, 401–02 (2010); Rao, supra note 33, at 1058–60. R
73. Bercovici, supra note 3, at 196. R
74. Gaia Bernstein, Regulating Reproductive Technologies: Timing, Uncertainty, and Donor
Anonymity, 90 B.U. L. REV. 89 (2010) (reviewing NAOMI R. CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES: WHY
THE FERTILITY MARKET NEEDS LEGAL REGULATION (2009)).
75. See infra notes 237–26 and accompanying text (discussing the consequences of increased R
regulation).
76. Ethics Comm. of the Am Soc’y for Reprod. Med., supra note 32, at 305–06 (explaining R
that some Internet advertisements have offered payments of $5,000 or more).  The guidelines
recommend limiting donor compensation to $5,000, with justifications for any amounts exceed-
ing this; amounts over $10,000 are inappropriate in all situations. Id.
77. See generally Am. Soc’y Reproductive Med., Informed Consent and the Use of Gametes
and Embryos for Research: A Committee Opinion, 101 FERTILITY & STERILITY 332 (2014) [here-
inafter ASRM, Informed Consent]; Margaret E. Swain, The Essentials of Informed Consent,
FAMILY ADVOCATE, Fall 2011, at 18.  Modern informed consent evolved from the common law
tort of battery, as a means to refuse nonconsensual contact or, in the medical context: unwanted
treatment or treatment that would be refused had the patient been fully informed.  Barbera
Atwell, The Modern Age of Informed Consent, 40 U RICHMOND L. REV. 591, 593–95 (2006).
Informed consent promotes a patient’s autonomy to make medical decisions. Id.
78. N.Y. EGG DONOR FACTS, supra note 29, at 19–20.  Proper informed consent is a delicate R
and fluid process that can involve many aspects and mechanisms. See Swain, supra note 77, at R
18.
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sent is typically carried out through a release form that is signed by
the donor, which indicates that she is fully aware of the risks and
processes, it is difficult to know exactly how much information is
given, how accurate the information is, and whether the donor has had
the necessary time and opportunity to comprehend the risks and ben-
efits associated with the procedures.79  The ASRM publishes stan-
dards for informed consent and recommends that any advertisements
recruiting donors that offer financial compensation must also disclose
the risks and burdens of egg donation.80  Even when proper risk dis-
closure is made, informed consent can be undermined and, thus, in-
complete, when there are conflicts of interest between the egg donor
and physician or clinic performing the retrieval.81  In addition to the
traditional ethical issues presented by egg donation, other ethical con-
cerns, such as conflicts of interest and biases, are presented by the
current structure of the U.S. ART industry.
2. Conflicts and Biases in the Egg Donation Process
Conflicts of interest are inherent in the typical donation process and
can introduce biases in the risk disclosure and retrieval processes.82
These conflicts of interest exist within the donation scheme because
recipients are the “patient” in the sense that the aim of the whole
process is to successfully impregnate them, and, even more so, be-
cause they are financing the entire procedure.83  The high costs of IVF
procedures usually limit the number of cycles a recipient can afford,
putting pressure on the clinics and physicians to maximize the chance
79. Alberta, supra note 42, at 233–234; Swain, supra note 77, at 18. R
80. See ASRM Informed Consent, supra note 77;  Ethics Comm. of the Am Soc’y for Reprod. R
Med., supra note 32, at 306.  Studies indicate that compliance with these recommendations is R
generally low.  Alberta, supra note 42.  California requires that recruitment advertisements to R
include risk disclosures. See infra note 134–135 and accompanying text (discussing California’s R
regulatory landscape).
81. Vanessa Gruben, Women as Patients, Not Spare Parts: Examining the Relationship Be-
tween the Physician and Women Egg Providers, 25 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 249, 270 (2013).
82. Id.; Judith Daar, Regulating the Fiction of Informed Consent in ART Medicine, AM. J.
BIOETHICS, Fall 2001, at 19; Gruben, supra note 81, at 270.  Conflict of interest arises from the R
physician’s dual role of treating both donors and recipients as patients.  The conflict is further
intensified by the strong financial tie between the recipient and physician.  Blake et al., supra
note 46, at 416.  This can cause the physician to prefer the medical and personal interests of the R
recipients, and disregard the interests of the donor, creating a bias favoring the recipients. Id.;
Andrea L. Kalfoglou & Gail Geller, Navigating Conflict of Interest in Oocyte Donation: An
Analysis of Donors’ Experiences, 10 WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES 226, 226–27 (2000).
83. Cone, supra note 4, at 202.  This bias will likely increase as the cost of IVF cycles have R
steadily increased and the ART industry expands and becomes more competitive.  Gruben,
supra note 81, at 270; Sauer, supra note 2.  There are also concerns about placing donors who R
were specifically picked because they were in good health but are now being subjected to risks
without any chance of a medical benefit to them.  Cone, supra note 4, at 190. R
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of obtaining pregnancies in the first cycle.84  There may also be an
incentive to retrieve as many eggs per donation cycle as possible be-
cause donors are compensated at a flat rate regardless of the number
of eggs obtained.85  Financial incentives can undermine informed con-
sent because physicians could purposely or unintentionally omit or
downplay descriptions of donation risks, ignore a donor’s predisposing
factors to OHSS, or make them reluctant to cancel or modify hyper-
stimulation cycles.86
These biases also stem from the financial structure of the U.S. ART
industry and the interaction of the parties involved.87  Scholars note
that the U.S. ART industry in the is one of the largest and most lucra-
tive of all countries that utilize these procedures.88  This may be due to
the industry’s private nature and structure, and the lack of enforceable
laws regulating it.89  There are several parties engaged in the ART
industry aside from the donors and recipients.90  The most involved
are the professional parties, such as the fertility clinics who facilitate
much of the process, physicians who perform the egg removal and em-
bryo implantation procedures, egg brokers who locate and recruit egg
donors, and pharmaceutical companies who manufacture drugs.91
Because fertility clinics are generally privately owned and derive
their income from treating recipients, it is in their best interest to at-
tract as many potential customers as possible.92  An important tool in
attracting customers is a clinic’s pregnancy success rates.93  The physi-
cians who perform the procedure likely have a financial stake in the
clinic; thus, they are also incentivized to maximize successful out-
comes by making risky choices for both the donor and the recipient.94
84. Cone, supra note 4, at 202. R
85. Judith Daar, Federalizing Embryo Transfers: Taming the Wild West of Reproductive
Medicine?, 23 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 257, 261 (2012).
86. Cone, supra note 4, at 199. R
87. Preisler, supra note 3, at 223–26. R
88. See, e.g., Aaron D. Levine, The Oversight and Practice of Oocyte Donation in the United
States, United Kingdom, and Canada, 23 HEC FORUM 15 (2011).
89. Cone, supra note 4, at 195. R
90. Roberts, supra note 2. R
91. Id.
92. Marvin, supra note 3, at 127. R
93. Preisler, supra note 3, at 226.  Although federal law requires these rates to be truthfully R
advertised, they are vulnerable to several methods of manipulation, such as clinics only taking
recipients with high chances of pregnancy and turning away older clients, and may encourage
clinics to transfer more embryos than is medically safe.  See generally, infra notes 110–117 and R
accompanying text (discussing the purpose of federal regulation).  Clinics may administer IVF to
recipients early on before trying less expensive and potentially effective options, so some of
these women could have gotten pregnant without IVF.  Preisler, supra note 3, at 223. R
94. See Durrell, supra note 32, at 221. R
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There are also egg brokers, or recruitment agencies who pair recipi-
ents with donors who have specific traits they desire.95  This third-
party service can be extremely lucrative, and brokers may facilitate
egg transactions between parties in two different countries.96  These
services contribute to the phenomenon of reproductive tourism in
which recipients seek ART treatments in other countries because they
are unavailable or too expensive in their native area.97  The parties
likely holding the largest stake in the ART industry are the pharma-
ceutical companies that manufacture the drugs necessary for hyper-
stimulation and implantation.98  Insurance companies are also
involved in the ART industry, but to a much lesser extent than the
others previously mentioned.99  Because of the many conflicts and in-
centives in the industry as well as the medical nature of the process,
there are some aspects of the egg donation that are regulated, while
other aspects remain unregulated.
C. Regulation of ART in the United States
Opponents of the U.S. ART industry criticize it for being one of the
least regulated of ART-involved countries.100  This could stem from
the dual nature in which egg donation is regulated as well as the lack
of comprehensive or enforceable guidelines that cover donation for
fertility treatments.101  At the state and federal levels, eggs that are
retrieved for stem cell research are subject to more comprehensive
regulations than those for fertility treatment.102  The egg donation in-
dustry for fertility purposes is largely left to professional self-regula-
tion.103  Although every state has laws concerning aspects related to
ART, these laws usually concern parentage of the resulting children or
ownership over embryos created for IVF, aspects of surrogacy con-
95. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Altruism and Intermediation in the Market for Babies, 66 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 203, 207, 234 (2009).  These brokers are a large concern because they generally fall
outside the few regulations in the industry. Cone, supra note 4, at 191. R
96. Cone, supra note 4, at 191–93, 196. R
97. J. Brad Reich & Dawn Swink, You Can’t Put the Genie Back in the Bottle: Potential Rights
and Obligations of Egg Donors in the Cyberprocreation Era, 20 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 20
(2010).
98. Sandra T. Jiminez, “My Body, My Right”: A Look Into IVF Regulation Through the Abor-
tion Legal Framework, 33 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 375, 383 (2012).
99. See infra notes 136–138 (discussing the role of insurance companies). R
100. See, e.g., Durrell, supra note 32, at 188–90; Frith & Blyth, supra note 3, at 516–17; R
Jocelyn Sweet, Safety and Access: Is the UK Regulatory Model Right for America?, 4 HEALTH L.
& POL’Y BRIEF 54, 54 (2010); Neal, supra note 33, at 615; Preisler, supra note 3, at 223, at 214. R
101. See Cone, supra note 4, at 190; Marvin, supra note 3, at 129. R
102. See Cone, supra note 4, at 189-92. R
103. See infra notes 139–141 and accompanying text (discussing these professional societies). R
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tracts, or the use of eggs and embryos for stem cell research.104  Al-
though some states have regulations in place to protect egg donors,
these regulations comprise only a patchwork of laws, and a majority of
states have no regulations in place to protect egg donors.105  The fol-
lowing section explains the regulations at the federal level and the
various approaches implemented by the states.
1. Regulation at the Federal Level
The substantial revenues generated by this private industry cer-
tainly have some impact on the national economy, and thousands of
egg donors and recipients are either positively or negatively affected
by ART every year.  Currently, the only federal laws related to egg
donation control the screening and handling of donor gametes, truth
in the advertising of fertility success rates, and the inability to com-
pensate egg donors for eggs to be used in stem cell research.
The primary federal legislation governing ART in the United States
is the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992
(FCSRCA).106  The FCSRCA requires the Secretary of the U.S. De-
partment of Health and Human Services (HHS) to annually collect
data through the CDC from fertility clinics.107  The FCSRCA also re-
quires the Secretary to develop model certification guidelines for the
states to certify fertility clinics inside their borders.108  However, states
are not required to adopt these model regulations or even create any
of their own.109  There are no current federal regulations directly su-
pervising aspects of egg donation.
The main purpose of the FCSRCA was intended for the protection
of consumers.110  The FCSRCA requires the CDC to collect informa-
tion and data concerning the pregnancy success rates of clinics and
compile this data in an annual report.111  This report also lists which
104. Sweet, supra note 100, at 55; Cone, supra note 4, at 206; see also Marvin, supra note 3, at R
133–34 (noting that state laws do not address the issues of the industry).
105. Kenneth Baum, Golden Eggs: Towards the Rational Regulation of Oocyte Donation, 2001
B.Y.U. L. REV. 107, 123–25; Cone, supra note 4, at 205; Marvin, supra note 3, at 129. R
106. Pub. L. No. 102-493, 106 Stat. 3146 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).  The FCSRCA refers to clinics as “assisted reproductive technology programs.”  42
U.S.C. § 263a-1(a) (2012).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 263a-1(a)(1).
108. Id. § 263a-2(a)(1).
109. See id. § 263a-2(b).
110. Preisler, supra note 3, at 218. R
111. 42 U.S.C.§ 263a-5(1)(A).  This data includes the number of cycles performed, the num-
ber of cycles that resulted in live births, the age of the recipients, the ages of donors, and the
number of embryos transferred.  Sunderam et al., supra note 1 at 6 fig.2.  Although success rates R
are calculated in several ways, the primary method is the percentage of cycles that resulted in
live births. Id. at 2.  This information is collected by Westat, Inc., a statistical survey research
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clinics have been certified by the CDC, state agencies, and profes-
sional associations as well as listing those that lack certification.112
The FCSRCA does not require the CDC to collect any information on
egg donors aside from their age, which is used to determine the effect
of donor age on pregnancy outcomes and the outcomes of donor eggs
in general.113  The purpose of collecting and publishing pregnancy suc-
cess rates is to ensure that fertility clinics are truthfully advertising
their success rates to recipients and to allow recipients to see which
clinics are certified.114  However, reporting is not mandatory.115  The
only consequence a clinic faces when failing to report the requested
data is being “listed as a non-reporter in the CDC’s website.”116
The FCRSCA’s ability to protect egg donors is severely limited be-
cause its own terms prohibit the Secretary of HHS or individual states
from establishing regulations, “which has the effect of exercising su-
pervision or control over the practice of medicine in assisted repro-
ductive technology programs.”117  If states did develop their own
regulations under the FCRSCA, they could not effectively regulate
the necessary aspects of the donation process, such as screening, in-
formed consent standards, or placing limits on the amount of eggs re-
trieved, because these regulations would amount to supervision of the
medical process.118
As the primary ART legislation in the United States, the FCSRCA
is far from comprehensive.  The two main components of the
FCSRCA are: (1) ensuring truthful advertising of pregnancy success
rates to prospective recipient consumers and (2) improving the quality
of IVF and other procedures.119  The only aspect concerning donors is
reporting the number of embryos transferred to recipients created
organization contracted by CDC, which maintains a list of all U.S. ART clinics known to be in
operation. Id. at 3.  Clinics submit their data online to the National ART Surveillance System
(NASS) operated by Westat who then relays the organized data to the CDC. Id. The CDC
annually audits a sample of clinics to ensure that they are reporting accurately. National ART
Surveillance: Why Do We Monitor Assisted Reproductive Technology?, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CON-
TROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/art/nass/index.html. (last updated Mar. 7, 2016).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 263a-5(1)(B).
113. See Frith & Blyth, supra note 3, at 518. R
114. See Preisler, supra note 3, at 217–18. R
115. Marvin, supra note 3, at 133. R
116. Id.
117. 42 U.S.C. § 263a-2(i).
118. See Preisler, supra note 3, at 220.  The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regu- R
lates and sets standards for the screening and testing of donor biological materials.  21 C.F.R.
§ 1271 (2015).  However, these regulations are designed to prevent the transfer of communicable
diseases, namely to the donor.  Frith & Blyth, supra note 3, at 518. R
119. Judith Daar, Federalizing Embryo Transfers: Taming the Wild West of Reproductive
Medicine?, 23 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 257, 268 (2012); Preisler, supra note 3, at 218–19. R
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with donor eggs and the ages of the donors.120  Clinic standards are
supposed to be based on model guidelines created by the CDC, but
states are free to develop their own programs.121  There is very little
sanctioning power granted by the FCSRCA; the penalty for not re-
porting is being listed as a nonreporting clinic in the CDC’s annual
report.122  And although the FDA requires donor screening, this is
only to prevent the spread of communicable diseases.123
The FCSRCA does not require states to adopt the model regula-
tions created under the FCSRCA or mandate that the states create
regulations of their own.124  Thus, federal regulations neither directly
supervise aspects of egg donation nor require that states supervise egg
donation on their own.  However, states are allowed to regulate egg
donation, although only a small minority of states have taken initia-
tives to do so.
2. Regulation by the Individual States and Professional Associations
The individual states are reserved implied police powers under the
Tenth Amendment to “protect the general health and welfare” of
their citizens.125  This grants states the ability to control the conduct
and morals of their citizens through means such as local law enforce-
ment or professional licensure.126  Despite their powers, few states
have passed regulations to protect egg donors.127  Most state laws reg-
ulating ART, when they exist, concern the disposition of donated ga-
metes, stem cell research, human cloning, parentage, and aspects of
surrogacy.128  Despite states’ inaction, there are some state laws that
are designed to protect donors, or, at the very least, affect the dona-
tion process.129
Some states, including Georgia and Louisiana, have chosen to ban
the sale of human eggs altogether.130  Other states have taken limited
120. See 21 C.F.R. § 1271.
121. 42 U.S.C. § 263a-2; Preisler, supra note 3, at 218. R
122. Reddix-Smalls, supra note 67, at 659. R
123. Frith & Blyth, supra note 3, at 518. R
124. 42 U.S.C. § 263a-2(b).
125. Michelle N. Meyer, States’ Regulation of Assisted Reproductive Technologies: What Does
the U.S. Constitution Allow?, 5 & 16 n.9 (Nelson A. Rockefeller Inst. of Gov., Harvard Law
Working Paper 2009), http://www.rockinst.org/pdf/health_care/2009-07-States_Regulation_ART
.pdf.
126. See id. at 14.
127. See Cone, supra note 4, at 208. R
128. Id. at 205, 208.
129. See infra notes 131–35 and accompanying text (e.g., Arizona, California, & New York). R
130. See, e.g., GA CODE ANN § 16-12-160 (2011); LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:122 (2008).
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steps in mandating informed consent requirements.131  For example,
Arizona has informed consent requirements and mandates that a phy-
sician-patient relationship exists between the doctor performing the
egg retrieval and the donor.132  New York has taken the most active
step in creating regulatory structures for the oversight of egg donation
under its State Task Force on Life and the Law, which has a special
advisory group for ART that creates guidelines for state clinics and
releases information for prospective donors.133  California is the only
state to take an initiative in passing regulations designed to protect
egg donors in a comprehensive manner, although its regulatory
scheme falls short of being comprehensive.134  California requires that
any advertisements offering monetary compensation for egg donation
disclose certain risks in the same advertisement.135
States have also tied some regulations to insurance coverage.136
Currently, seventeen states have some law that requires certain insur-
ance plans to cover certain ART procedures.137  For instance, Arkan-
sas requires that clinics be licensed or certified by the Arkansas
Department of Health and conform to the guidelines released by the
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists to have the pro-
cedures covered by insurance.138
Aside from New York and California, the few states that are highly
involved in regulating ART, the last remaining safeguard between do-
nors and the financial incentives of the industry comes from ASRM’s
self-regulating guidelines.  Two national professional societies, ASRM
and the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology (SART), cer-
131. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-1702 (2014) (stating that prior to a medical procedure, a
physician must provide the donor with information such as a description of the hormones the egg
donor will need to take, all procedures that will be performed, and any potential risks); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125325 (West 2012) (if an entity advertises for egg donation, it must
also provide a notice on the advertisement concerning medical risks and other information);
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 52-8.8 (2014) (requiring informed consent, which in-
cludes the donor acknowledging notice to information such as the donor’s name and address,
will remain on a file, genetic testing will be performed, and the donor has a right to withdraw her
consent).
132. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-1702.
133. N.Y. EGG DONOR FACTS, supra note 29, at 2, 5; Sweet, supra note 100, at 55 (2010). R
134. Cone, supra note 4, at 192. R
135. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125325.
136. See Jim Hawkins, Selling ART: An Empirical Assessment of Advertising on Fertility Clin-
ics’ Websites, 88 IND. L.J. 1147, 1163–64, 1167 (2013).
137. State Infertility Insurance Laws, AM. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED., http://www.asrm.org/
insurance.aspx (last updated Mar. 11, 2016, 12:22 PM) (listing fifteen states); State Laws Related
to Insurance Coverage for Infertility Treatments, NAT’L CON. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl
.org/research/health/insurance-coverage-for-infertility-laws.aspx (last updated June 2014) (listing
seventeen states).
138. ARK. CODE. ANN. §§ 23-85-137, 23-86-118 (2014).
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tify and issue guidelines for fertility clinics.139  ASRM issued guidance
limiting donor compensation, suggesting standards for informed con-
sent, discussing the disclosure of financial interests, and recom-
mending the medical and psychological screening of donors.140
Compliance with these guidelines is completely voluntary, and adher-
ing to them is not required for professional certification, which is also
voluntary and not required to work in the ART industry.141
There is almost no data on donor outcomes or their donation exper-
iences.142  Because of this, it is unknown how many physicians and
clinics operate outside the ASRM guidelines or engage in other un-
professional conduct with donors.143  This absence of data stems from
the limited oversight by most states and the federal reporting require-
ments being limited to pregnancy outcomes.144
The lack of regulation and oversight regarding the egg donation
process make the ethical issues surrounding egg donors even more
concerning.  None of the regulations at the federal level concern the
egg donation process directly; self-regulation by professional societies
is ineffective due to a lack of oversight and enforcement, and only a
small minority of states that permit egg donation have laws designed
to protect egg donors.  Thus, uniform and comprehensive changes are
necessary to ensure that egg donors are not exposed to unethical
treatment from industry players.  However, there are several potential
explanations as to why egg donation has not received greater regula-
tion in the United States.145  Accordingly, any comprehensive reforms
designed to protect egg donors must avoid these issues.  Reforms with
minimal administrative burdens that can shift the incentives within the
egg donation process may be able to avoid these barriers while still
protecting egg donors.
139. Levine, supra note 42, at 26; Marvin, supra note 3, at 136–47; Preisler, supra note 3, at R
220–21. See, e.g., ASRM, Informed Consent, supra note 77; Ethics Comm. of the Am Soc’y for R
Reprod. Med., supra note 26; ASRM, Definitions of Infertility, supra note 17. R
140. See, e.g., ASRM, Criteria for a Number of Embryos to Transfer, supra note 53; AM. SOC’Y R
REPRODUCTIVE MED., Recommendations for Gamete and Embryo Donation: A Committee
Opinion, 99 FERTILITY & STERILITY 47, 47 (2013) [hereinafter ASRM, Recommendations for
Gamete and Embryo Donation].
141. Preisler, supra note 3, at 221. R
142. See Boutelle, supra note 61, at 116–17. R
143. See Gruben, supra note 81, at 257–58. R
144. See id. at 270.
145. See supra notes 210–50 and accompanying text (discussing the barriers to regulating ART R
and egg donation).
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III. ANALYSIS
The general lack of uniform regulation of the U.S. ART industry is
troubling146—especially in light of the inherent risks in donation,147
the coercively high compensation paid to donors,148 and the billion
dollar revenues the industry generates.149  The actual interactions be-
tween donors and clinics are impossible to measure because this infor-
mation is not reported.150  Presumptively, the overwhelming majority
of ART physicians and clinics, as in any medical practice area in the
United States, are ethically sound doctors concerned for the safety
and well being of both donors and recipients.  Nevertheless, there are
certainly unethical doctors in any practice, and without any federal
laws requiring special standards for fertility physicians and clinics to
follow, egg donors will likely remain vulnerable to coercive and preda-
tory practices. Given the financial incentives competing in the priva-
tized nature of the industry, driven by the increased emphasis on
success rates from the FCSRCA reporting requirements, as well as the
peculiar medical relationships and duties within the U.S. donor pro-
cess, concerns of unprofessional conduct existing in this relatively un-
supervised area of medicine are not unjustified.
The individual states, rather than the federal government, are more
than capable, if not better positioned, to conduct the primary over-
sight and regulation of ART due to their reserved authority over
medicine and health related areas.151  Furthermore, there are benefits
in allowing the laboratory of the states to test different regulatory
schemes of ART and to provide their residents with a choice.152  And,
despite the fact that the regulation of medicine has traditionally been
reserved to the states under their police powers and the fact that Con-
gress’s role in governing medicine was traditionally limited,153 deci-
sions upholding aspects of Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act (ACA)154 suggest that Congress may have more authority than
146. Durrell, supra note 32, at 188; Neal, supra note 33, at 611–12; Preisler, supra note 3, at R
214. See generally Frith & Blyth, supra note 3, at 517–19 (discussing the limitations of R
regulations);
147. See supra notes 55–62 and accompanying text (discussing the associated medical risks). R
148. See supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text (discussing the associated ethical risks). R
149. Marvin, supra note 3, at 120. R
150. Boutelle, supra note 61, at 117; see supra notes 100–23 and accompanying text (discussing R
the lack of ART regulation and reporting standards in the United States).
151. Meyer, supra note 125, at 2. R
152. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
153. See Meyer, supra note 125, at 5. R
154. Pub. L. No. 11-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
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previously thought.155  Although states are believed to be best suited
to regulate aspects of egg donation,156 only a few states have passed
laws with the purpose or effect of protecting donors.157  And, although
Congress has typically been limited in its ability to regulate medicine,
it may have a stronger ability to do so in the post-ACA regulatory
jurisprudence.158
It is unlikely that many states will heed the call for reforms from
scholars,159 and it is even more unlikely that the federal government
will step up and begin tightly regulating and supervising the egg dona-
tion industry.160  Therefore, it is necessary for the federal government
to spur the states themselves into properly regulating egg donation
under their police powers.  This Part begins by proposing that the cur-
rent federal reporting scheme not only fails to account for the safety
of egg donors, but may even be further jeopardizing it by emphasizing
high success rates.  This Part then argues that federal action is neces-
sary to incentivize states into regulating egg donation more closely,
offering potential forms of supervision that could aid in counteracting
the prorecipient biases through expanded insurance recovery to incen-
tivize compliance with professional standards and a more robust fed-
eral reporting scheme to include information on egg donors.
A. Regulatory Gaps Leave Donors Vulnerable to Biases and May
Actually Increase Them
Without any significant monitoring of egg donation or mandatory
guidelines concerning their treatment, physicians and clinics are
155. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2599 (2012) (upholding
the individual mandate requires tax payers to purchase health insurance as a tax, thus suggesting
that Congress has broader authority to regulate medicine than previously suggested). See gener-
ally ANNIE L. MACH & BERNADETTE FERNANDEZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42069, PRIVATE
HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET REFORMS IN THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 1–2 (2014) (explaining
that “[w]hile such market reforms may be new at the federal level,” the “ACA follows the model
of federalism that has been employed in prior federal health insurance reform efforts”); Liz
Festa, State v. Federal Regulation Debate a ‘Relic,’ Says FIO Chief McRaith, INS. J. (Feb. 6, 2014),
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2014/02/06/319683.htm (arguing that the state
versus federal oversight debate is no longer relevant).
156. Meyer, supra note 125, at 2.
157. See supra notes 129–35 and accompanying text. R
158. See KATHLEEN S. SWENDIMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40846, HEALTH CARE: CON-
STITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND LEGISLATIVE POWERS (2012).
159. Michael Ollove, States Not Eager To Regulate Fertility Industry, PEW CHARITABLE
TRUSTS: RESEARCH & ANALYSIS—STATELINE (Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/re-
search-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2015/3/18/states-not-eager-to-regulate-fertility-industry.
160. See infra notes 210–23 and accompanying text (discussing the issues related to federal R
oversight & federalism).
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largely free to treat donors as they see fit.161  Although most physi-
cians conform to professionally ethical practices, the financial incen-
tives from the lucrative industry may bias their interactions with
donors.162  Financial interests may bias clinics and physicians toward
giving preferential consideration to the recipient, the party funding
the entire treatment process, and the ART industry.163
On an ethical level, a clinic’s or physician’s financial interest in
treatment outcomes creates a conflict of interest that undermines the
informed consent given to donors.164  If the recipients have a particu-
lar egg donor in mind, the financial conflict of interest could cause
clinics or their staff to ensure that the preferred donor goes through
with the donation and that the recipients will retain the clinics ser-
vices.165  The person providing information to the donor for informed
consent may unconsciously or purposely downplay or omit some of
the risks and procedures accompanying egg donation to avoid scaring
donors away from the procedure.166  Clinics and their staff may also
overlook certain characteristics in donors that predispose them or in-
crease the likelihood of post donation complications, especially do-
nors who have donated in the past.167
These conflicts of interest also reach the medical aspects of the do-
nation process. Physicians are not limited in their choice of what drugs
to administer for the hormone stimulation or the type of procedure to
remove the eggs; thus, the biases could cause physicians to choose re-
moval methods or drugs that are not in the donor’s best interests.168
Physicians are also given discretion in the amount of eggs they can
retrieve per donation cycle, although the ASRM has guidelines sug-
gesting limits.169  Complications, such as OHSS, significantly increase
161. Boutelle, supra note 61, at 114. R
162. See supra notes 82–94 and accompanying text (discussing the biases in the donation R
process).
163. Cholst, supra note 71, at 1561; Gruben, supra note 81, at 270; Kalfoglou & Geller, supra R
note 82, at 226–27; Suter, supra note, 46 at 239; see Cone, supra note 4, at 202. R
164. Gruben, supra note 81, at 270. R
165. See Cone, supra note 4, at 196–97. R
166. Gruben, supra note 81, at 270. R
167. Id. at 268–69.
168. Id at 263.  Physicians choose the drugs and removal methods. Id. at 258.  There are also
of financial conflicts of interests between clinics, physicians, and the donor. Id. at 267; Blake et
al., supra note 46, at 411, 416; Durrell, supra note 32, at 220–21; Gruben, supra note 81, at 268; R
Kalfoglou & Geller, supra note 163, at 226–27 (discussing the pressures on doctors to favor the R
recipients); Suter, supra note 46, at 238–40. R
169. Gruben, supra note 81, at 258 n.54 (“For example, the ASRM does not set a limit on the
number of eggs per retrieval.”); ASRM, Recommendations for Gamete and Embryo Donation,
supra note 140, at 53 (suggesting that a single donor should be limited to no more than twenty- R
five births in a population of 800,000).
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when more eggs are retrieved.170  Yet, there is an incentive to remove
as many eggs as possible per donation cycle because the treatment
expenses and compensation are not changed by the amount of eggs
retrieved.171
Even if a majority of clinics and physicians remain unbiased from
the financial pressures of the industry, there are some fertility profes-
sionals who will subject donors to unjustified risks to further their own
financial interests.  Possibly the greatest threat to donors is the poten-
tial lack of recourse when they suffer complications, whether those
risks result from risks inherent in the donation process or from less-
than best physician practices.172  It is difficult to determine the amount
of negligent practice that occurs in the U.S. ART industry.173  This
could indicate overall adherence to professional standards and unbi-
ased treatment of donors.  But, there could also be difficulties in do-
nors holding clinics accountable for unprofessional conduct.174
170. Gruben, supra note 81, at 175. R
171. Id. at 269.
172. Daar, supra note 85, at 278 (arguing that claims are seldom brought and those that are R
brought are usually unsuccessful).
173. The ASRM does not publish disciplinary actions. See E-mail from Sean Tipton, Chief
Policy, Advocacy and Development Officer, Am. Society for Reproductive Medicine, to author
(May 31, 2016, 10:05 AM) (on file with author).  One source of information concerning miscon-
duct are state medical licensing boards, but getting the necessary information would require
sorting through all reported actions. FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., U.S. MEDICAL REGULATORY
TRENDS AND ACTIONS, 7–10, 18–20 (2014) [hereinafter FSMB REGULATORY TRENDS AND AC-
TIONS]; Links to State Medical Boards, AM. MED. ASS’N, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/edu-
cation-careers/becoming-physician/medical-licensure/state-medical-boards.page (last visited May
17, 2016).  The main resource for issues between donors and unprofessional clinics is, presuma-
bly, the ASRM, who directs the allegedly wronged donor to the particular state medical board or
other licensing authority. AM. SOC’Y FOR REPRODUCTIVE MED., OVERSIGHT OF ASSISTED RE-
PRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 3, 5, 10 (2010) [hereinafter OVERSIGHT OF ART].  Every state has
some licensing authority that handles disciplinary conduct of physicians. See, e.g. FSMB REGU-
LATORY TRENDS AND ACTIONS, supra note 173; Links to State Medical Boards, AM. MED. ASS’N, R
supra note 173.  Depending on the circumstances, nonadherence to ASRM guidelines, such as R
retrieving too many eggs, could lead to disciplinary actions from the licensing board, as well as
any criminal liability for sever violations. See OVERSIGHT OF ART, supra note 173, at 5. R
174. Daar, supra note 85, at 311, 313; Durrell, supra note 32, at 222 (arguing that a court could R
find that no patient–physician relationship existed); Jacob Radecki, Note, The Scramble to Pro-
mote Egg Donation Through a More Protective Regulatory Regime, 90 CHI.-KENT L. REV 729,
752 (2015) (arguing that some typical malpractice coverage is insufficient to protect donors).  It
is unclear whether certain unprofessional conduct would be actionable.  Gross medical negli-
gence would be disciplined by the state licensing board and governed by state tort law, but
complications resulting from nonadherence to ASRM guidelines may not be fully reprehensible
by state boards if clinics and doctors are not bound by them. But see Daar, supra note 85, at R
271–72 (noting that Dr. Michael Kamrava disregarded the established guidelines and although a
court was not willing to suspend his license, on further review the state medical board suspended
his license because he failed to adhere to the voluntary guidelines). It may be difficult for do-
nors to bring suit because they may have waived their rights through contracts with the fertility
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Without the collection and recording of the drugs administered to
donors for ovarian stimulation by a regulatory body or professional
association, similar to the records kept by SART and the CDC on
embryo transfers and outcomes, there is no way to track and study the
side effects and long-term risks of those drugs; and, there are no cur-
rent guidelines covering the amount or type of fertility drugs adminis-
tered aside from the requirement that they obtain FDA approval.175
Further, there are no mandatory laws limiting the amount of eggs re-
trieved in the United States.176  Under the current regulatory laws,
doctors are afforded great discretion in the donation process, leaving
them free to compete with other clinics with maximized efficiency in
egg retrieval and transfer and experimenting with new procedures and
techniques.177  The lack of any binding standards regulating the medi-
cal aspect stems from the FCSRCA’s prohibition on HHS “exercising
supervision or control over the practice of medicine in [ART]
programs.”178
Good fertility rates are extremely valuable to fertility clinics, but
because the FCSRCA holds success rates as the sole and primary
measure distinguishing the efficacy of fertility clinics, these clinics
must strive harder to keep their rates competitively high.179  Although
the reasons behind the FCRSCA’s reporting requirement to ensure
truthfully advertised success rates were well intentioned,180 they may
empower the recipient-preferential bias.  Clinics will sometimes skew
their definitions of pregnancies or terminate those unlikely to result in
live birth to boost their success rates.181  The success rates place such a
large emphasis on achieving pregnancy that they are incentivized to
attain pregnancies at all costs and retain the recipient’s business by
making them happy.  Although success rates were important in the
past, under the current federal regulations, they are now the primary
goal of fertility clinics.  Because the current regulatory scheme has
substantial gaps regarding the well-being of egg donors, more robust
regulation and oversight is necessary to ensure that donors are insu-
lated from potentially unethical treatment.
clinic or they may not be able to state a claim for a lack of informed consent due to the lack of a
doctor–patient relationship between them and the physician.  Durrell, supra note 32, at 222–23. R
175. Judy Norsigian, Egg Donation for IVF and Stem Cell Research: Time to Weigh the Risks
to Women’s Health, DIFFERENT TAKES 33, Spring 2005, AT 1, 2 (Spring 2005).
176. Gruben, supra note 81, at 258. R
177. Reddix-Smalls, supra note 67, at 672. R
178. 42 U.S.C. § 263a-2(i)(1) (2012).
179. Blake et al., supra note 46, at 416; Durrell, supra note 32, at 216. R
180. See Reddix-Smalls, supra note 67, at 659. R
181. See Durrell, supra note 32, at 216. R
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B. Setting Limits and Shifting Incentives To Protect Donors
This Section proposes two regulatory changes to protect egg donors.
The first is a structural change at the federal level that encourages
states to regulate ART more closely, to follow the example of some
states by mandating insurance coverage for ART,182 and tie reim-
bursement to compliance with state or professional association guide-
lines and expanded reporting requirements.183  The second
substantively broadens the current federal reporting requirements to
cover donor information and clinical aspects of the donation process,
providing valuable insight into the outcomes of egg donation as well
as opportunities to detect unprofessional clinics and doctors, and to
allow donors to hold them accountable.184
1. Tying Insurance Coverage to Compliance with State or Federal
Certification
The current regulatory scheme in the United States lacks enforcea-
ble standards at the federal level and only has very few at the state
level.  Increasing insurance coverage of fertility treatments and tying
reimbursement to clinic compliance with state or professional certifi-
cation would greatly increase oversight and subsequently help do-
nors.185  This could be done by requiring states to either require
fertility services as “essential health benefits”186 or ban egg donation
in their state.  Standard fertility treatments would remain legal, but
states that desire to allow egg donation must take some steps to regu-
late it and require insurance coverage for eligible couples.187
182. See infra notes 185–86 and accompanying text (arguing that states should either require R
fertility services as “essential health benefits” or ban egg donation in their state).
183. See infra notes 188–89 and accompanying text (arguing that states that do choose to R
permit ART treatments and compensation for eggs should be required to create some oversight
structure that could be tailored within certain regulatory limits).
184. See infra notes 192–201 and accompanying text (arguing that collecting information on R
the donor and the donation process could help curb unprofessional conduct).
185. Daar, supra note 85, at 323 (“While the problems with clinical guidelines would remain a R
provision that mandated reporting . . . combined with a penalty for false reporting — could act as
an incentive for adherence.  Knowing that [reports] could trigger provider scrutiny, ART doctors
would take care to follow and accurately report clinical practices.”); OVERSIGHT OF ART, supra
note 173, at 10. R
186. See The Affordable Care Act and Infertility, NAT’L INFERTILITY ASS’N, http://
www.resolve.org//the-center-for-infertility-justice/public-policy/-care-act-and-infertil-
ity.html?print=t%201/5 (last updated Feb. 17, 2014).
187. Although there may be potential counterarguments that couples who are too poor to
afford insurance would be disadvantaged in seeking egg donation and IVF, out of pocket costs
for such procedures are extremely high to begin with; and additionally, studies have confirmed
that increased insurance coverage for infertility treatments increases access. See OVERSIGHT OF
ART, supra note 173, at 10; Barton H. Hamilton & Brian McManus, The Effects of Insurance R
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States that do choose to permit ART treatments and compensation
for eggs should be required to create some structure of oversight that
can be tailored to fit within certain regulatory limits or, at the very
least, set regulations based on the ASRM guidelines.  Upper limits
should be set for the number of eggs retrieved from donors,188 screen-
ing standards should automatically exclude donors with certain risk
factors, uniform informed consent guidelines should be mandated
with some form of ensuring compliance,189 reporting should be ex-
panded, and postdonation follow-ups should be required.
These limits should not be hard lines, and violations should not au-
tomatically bring punishment.  Doctors should be allowed to go
outside the limits when providing treatment, such as taking eggs or
implanting embryos, above the guideline limits.190  But, because this
information will be reported under the new regulatory scheme, doc-
tors should give some explanation for the exception.  In addition to
some of the incentives produced from increased insurance coverage,
mandating physicians and clinics to report more information concern-
ing the donor may also help balance the prorecipient incentives that
exist within the privatized industry structure and possibly strength-
ened by the current reporting scheme.191
Mandates on Choices and Outcomes in Infertility Treatment Markets; 21 H. ECON. 994, 1009
(2012); J. Ryan Martin et al., Insurance Coverage and In Vitro Fertilization Outcomes: A U.S.
Perspective, 95 FERTILITY & STERILITY 964, 968 (2011) (“It is also recognized that insurance
coverage would provide access to infertility treatment for those who previously could not afford
it.”).
188. ASRM, Recommendations for Gamete and Embryo Donation, supra note 140, at 53. R
189. This could be accomplished through a detailed and comprehensive informed consent
form approved by the state regulatory body.
190. See David Adamson, Regulation of Assisted Reproductive Technologies in the United
States, 39 FAM. L.Q. 727, 738 (2005); OVERSIGHT OF ART, supra note 173, at 11.  Although R
transferring multiple embryos is almost always risky, the ASRM believes that doctors should be
able to use their professional judgment to render different types of care in different
circumstances:
a simple legal restriction on the number of embryos transferred would not be desirable.
It is preferable that the clinical judgment of highly trained specialty physicians, brought
to bear on the particular circumstances of each case and made with evidence-based
national guidelines in mind, determine the course of treatment. While properly crafted
language in a widely adopted medical practice act requiring specialists in ART to follow
ASRM guidelines unless otherwise indicated might improve the uniformity of practice
nationwide, it is important to recognize that ART is already one of most highly regu-
lated of all medical practices in the United States.
OVERSIGHT OF ART, supra note 173, at 11. R
191. The ASRM has acknowledged that increased insurance coverage may allow physicians to
make the most medically appropriate decisions and would help eliminate financial pressures.
OVERSIGHT OF ART, supra note 173, at 10.  ASRM also suggests that states and insurers could R
tie coverage and reimbursement to adherence to the ASRM’s guidelines. Id.; Marvin, supra
note 3, at 133–34.  Additionally, studies have shown that states that implemented insurance cov- R
erage for ART had a lower number of multiple embryo transfers than states without insurance
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2. Expand Reporting Requirements and Follow-Up
Under the current reporting scheme, the only information reported
concerns the accurate advertising of pregnancy success rates, thus fur-
thering the already strong incentive to achieve maximum pregnancy
rates.  Collecting information on the donor and the donation process
could help curb unprofessional conduct.  The limit to this is that doc-
tors are not likely to explicitly report their unprofessional conduct.
Requiring doctors to report more information on the donation process
may cause them to internalize some of the aggressive retrieval meth-
ods or unprofessional conduct to which donors are subjected.
It is nearly impossible to obtain confident estimates on the actual
risk outcomes of egg donation in the United States192 and the amount
of unprofessional conduct performed by clinics and physicians.193
There is no adequate data on risk outcomes because there is no infor-
mation on post-donation outcomes reported;194 further, there are no
mandatory requirements to follow-up with donors.195  Clinics should
be required by law to collect and report information on donors’ back-
grounds and standard medical information, such as age, height,
weight, average blood pressure, and any other factors that could affect
a donor’s predisposition to poor donation outcomes, such as previous
donation.196
coverage.  Tarun Jain et al., Insurance Coverage and Outcomes of In Vitro Fertilization, 347 N.
ENG. J. MED 661, 664–66 (2002); Martin et al., supra note 187, at 967–68. R
192. Bercovici, supra note 3, at 199; Durrell, supra note 32, at 188; Cone, supra note 4, at 200; R
Marvin, supra note 3, at 123. R
193. For purposes of this Comment, “unprofessional conduct” refers to any aspect of donor
treatment when the donors’ best interests are ignored in favor of financial motivations or other
forms of conflict.  Defining unprofessional conduct is difficult in the United States because it
may be based on ethical or practice standards imposed by state medical boards or professional
societies such as the ASRM, or from the standard of care established for medical malpractice
claims. Marvin, supra note 3, at 131–34; OVERSIGHT OF ART, supra note 173, at 4–5, 9, 11. R
Aside from gross negligence or criminal violations common to any type of doctor, there are few
binding regulations on fertility doctors other than those imposed by state medical boards or
individual requirements imposed by states with broader regulation of the ART industry.
Luetkemeyer, supra note 72, at 412; Marvin, supra note 3, at 131–34 (“[V]ery few states have R
laws that genuinely address the issues within the ART industry.”).
194. Although some studies have been conducted, they are either severely limited in sample
size or self-reported questionnaires.  Boutelle, supra note 61, at 117. R
195. Id.
196. See ASRM, Recommendations for Gamete and Embryo Donation, supra note 140, at R
53–58 (listing the criteria for screening requirements); Kayla Mossien, The Importance of Surro-
gate’s and Egg Donor’s Body Mass Index (BMI), CIRCLE SURROGACY, http://www.circlesurroga
cy.com/blog/2015/06/25/the-importance-of-body-mass-index/ (June 25, 2015) (“Egg donors are
required to be of proportionate height and weight, as being overweight may affect egg quality, as
well as necessitate higher doses of stimulation drugs to create follicles.”); Egg Donor Screening,
EGG DONOR INFO. PROJECT, https://web.stanford.edu/class/siw198q/websites/eggdonor/screening
.html (last updated June 5, 2002)
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Doctors should also be required to report clinical aspects of the do-
nation, such as the type and amount of drugs used for ovarian hyper-
stimulation, the length and timing of the cycle, and the type of
removal procedure used.  Reporting this information would allow
long-term and comprehensive tracking of outcomes with certain drugs
and egg removal methods.  The most crucial piece of information
would be the amount of eggs removed, which is generally proportional
to the type of hyperstimulation drugs administered.197  This would
also help detect physicians who seek more eggs than they should or
choose hyperstimulation regimes that place donors at risk.198
Due to the lack of binding regulations concerning the donation pro-
cess, certain treatments are left to the doctor’s discretion, such as the
type and amount of drugs to administer for ovarian stimulation, the
approval of donors for donation in screening, informed consent pro-
cess and methods, the amount of eggs retrieved, and whether to follow
up with the donor.199  It is within this range of discretion in which
doctors are able to make decisions that may not be in the best interest
of the donor.  Because there is a general desire to keep the practice of
medicine flexible and not constrain medical decisions with strict laws,
regulations setting strict limits on these discretionary aspects should
be avoided.200  Monitoring these aspects could help deter unprofes-
sional conduct without unduly constraining the practice of medicine in
ART.
By reporting aspects of the donor’s relevant medical information
that should be included in most screenings, certain predisposing risk
factors leading to poor outcomes could be identified.201  This informa-
tion could also identify clinics retrieving eggs from women who may
not be particularly suited for donation.  The last aspect of reporting,
and the most critical, would be a requirement to follow-up with do-
nors.  Requiring clinics to contact donors one to two weeks after do-
nation would ensure that both valuable information on donation
outcomes are collected and help provide donors with recourse in the
event of post-donation complications.202
197. Gruben, supra note 81, at 175; . R
198. See Blake et al., supra note 46, at 421–22; OVERSIGHT OF ART, supra note 173, at 10–11. R
199. Id. at 258; Blake et al., supra note 46, at 421–22. R
200. See, e.g., OVERSIGHT OF ART, supra note 173, at 11 (arguing that a strict restriction on R
the number of embryos that can be transferred is not desirable).
201. See ASRM, Recommendations for Gamete and Embryo Donation, supra note 140, at 55. R
202. See Cone, supra note 4, at 214–15 (“Often, clinics do not keep donors’ medical records, R
making it difficult for donors to seek recourse if they experience complications and making it
impossible for researchers to effectively monitor donors for long-term side effects such as infer-
tility and increased risk of cancer.”) (citing Sunni Yeun, An Information Privacy Approach to
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Mandating broader insurance coverage of ART, along with ex-
panded reporting requirements, may help shift the incentives cur-
rently present in the egg donation process and lead to greater
adherence to professional standards.  These regulations would not ne-
cessitate large regulatory bodies, although they may be best despite
the administrative and financial burdens on the federal and state gov-
ernments, and the tradeoff between expanded insurance generating
greater revenues for the ART industry would counteract fears of in-
creased oversight from those involved.
Once states are required to cover infertility treatments as essential
health benefits, the insurers will have to tie reimbursement to adher-
ence with some set of professional and clinical standards.203  Insurers
could either create their own standards or adopt those from the
ASRM and SART.204  This may not cure all issues associated with the
current incentive scheme in the donation process, the fear of losing
reimbursement for potential violations, or false reporting may incen-
tivize adherence.205 Finally, these expanded reporting requirements
could be included within the current regime created under the
FCSRCA206 or could also go through the existing structures of insur-
ance companies for reviewing submissions for reimbursement.207 Re-
search on the effect of insurance mandates providing coverage for
infertility treatments on multiple birth rates indicates that insurance
coverage may be an effective form of enforcing professional stan-
dards.208  And just like the cost savings to the health care industry
from fewer multiple births, fewer instances of OHSS or other poor
outcomes from donation could create cost savings as well.209
Regulating the Middlemen in the Lucrative Gametes Market, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 527, 550
(2007)).
203. See Baum, supra note 26, at 125; Daar, supra note 85, at 323; Marvin, supra note 3, at R
133–34.
204. OVERSIGHT OF ART, supra note 173, at 10–11; Daar, supra note 85, at 323; Marvin, supra R
note 3, at 134. R
205. Blake et al., supra note 46, at 421–22; Daar, supra note 85, at 324. R
206. Blake et al., supra note 46, at 421–22. R
207. Baum, supra note 26, at 125; Daar, supra note 85, at 324; Marvin, supra note 3, at 134. R
208. See OVERSIGHT OF ART, supra note 173, at 10; Daar, supra note 85, at 323–24; Jain et al., R
supra note 191, at 664–66; Martin et al., supra note 187, at 967–68.  However, researchers attri- R
bute this success in reducing multiple births to changes in economic interests, namely that gener-
ous insurance coverage reduces the burden on achieving a successful pregnancy from one cycle,
as opposed to utilizing aggressive treatments to maximizing chances of success. See OVERSIGHT
OF ART, supra note 173, at 10; Martin et al., supra note 187, at 967–68.  Some also attribute it to R
changes in characteristics of patients pursuing treatment once coverage is available.  Jain & et al.,
supra note 191, at 664–66; Martin et al., supra note 187, at 968.  However, regardless of the exact R
mechanism for achieving reduced multiple births, it has the effect of encouraging greater adher-
ence to professional standards.  Martin et al., supra note 187, at 968. R
209. See Martin et al., supra note 187, at 968.
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However, there have been several explanations as to why ART and
egg donation specifically have not received greater regulation in the
United States.  Accordingly, the reforms suggested by this Comment
must navigate the barriers that have prevented earlier reforms.
IV. IMPACT
There are several potential explanations for the lack of comprehen-
sive federal ART regulation in the United States.  By analyzing these
barriers in light of previously proposed reforms as well as the insur-
ance and reporting regulations suggested in this Comment, insight can
be gained as to how to best solve these issues in the current industry
structure.  Some of the most oft-cited barriers to regulation include:
(1) the administrative burdens of expanding federal regulations and
oversight; (2) the argument that the federal government does not have
the constitutional authority to regulate areas so closely related to
medicine, procreation, and privacy interests; (3) opposition from the
industry and religious groups; and (4) feared negative consequences of
over-regulating ART and egg donation.
1. Issues Related to Expanded Federal Oversight
The United States’ regulatory structure differs from those of other
developed nations that have significant demand for ART and donor
eggs.210  In the United Kingdom, ART is directly regulated by the
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA), which con-
trols the licensing and inspection of facilities performing ART proce-
dures, such as IVF, or conducting research on human embryos.211
Canada also has a national oversight committee.212  These countries
monitor and regulate the practice of ART more closely than the
United States and also limit the amount of compensation donors may
receive for eggs or ban anonymous donations.213
Similar oversight and regulation in the United States would help
prevent some of the biases and issues present in the ART industry.214
Nevertheless, the increased regulations in these countries have nega-
tively impacted their industries and could be disastrous for the U.S.
210. Levine, supra note 88, at 16–20 (examining the oversight structure of ART in the United R
Kingdom, Canada, and the United States).
211. See id. at 16–17.
212. See id. at 18 (noting that Canada relies on Assisted Human Reproduction Canada, a
central oversight agency).
213. Id. at 20, 22 tbl.1.
214. Sweet, supra note 100, at 62 (arguing for a model similar to the United Kingdom’s). R
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industry.215  Thus, any regulation must balance the interests at
stake.216  Some have proposed the creation of a federal agency or au-
thority charged with regulating and monitoring the ART industry,
such as the United Kingdom’s HFEA.217  The changes proposed by
this Comment would not require the creation of a federal oversight
authority, and they could be implemented within existing regulatory
structures.
2. Federalism Issues
The FCSRCA is self-limiting in the sense that it specifically prohib-
its the Secretary of HHS from passing regulations with the “effect of
exercising supervision or control over the practice of medicine in
[ART] programs.”218  However, there may have been concerns of
Federalism when the legislatures passed the FCSRCA in 1991.219
States are typically reserved the authority to regulate and “protect
the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens.”220  These “police
powers” have typically reserved the regulation of medicine to the
states, allowing them to control the licensure of doctors and hospitals
as well as setting certain standards.221  Thus, individual states are free
to regulate ART in any way they see fit, as illustrated by the variety of
ART regulations throughout the several states.222  This reservation of
police powers to states is an implied denial to the federal government
to regulate these areas, and federal regulations infringing on these ar-
eas are vulnerable to constitutional challenges.223  However, the fed-
eral government is allowed to set certain standards in these reserved
areas, specifically requirements for insurance coverage, as shown
through the decisions upholding many portions of the Affordable
215. See infra notes 237–43 and accompanying text (noting some of the consequences the R
United Kingdom has experienced in their oversight of ART).
216. See Daar, supra note 85, at 292 (discouraging distasteful or invasive measures). R
217. See, e.g., id. at 286 n.119, 287.
218. 42 U.S.C. § 263a-2 (2012).
219. See Meyer, supra note 125, at 2 (arguing that, in generally, the governmental interest in R
procreation belong to the states).  Federalism is the principle that authority to regulate specific
areas of the United States be distributed between the federal government, and those of the
several states. See id. at 5 (noting that our constitutional framework requires the states to regu-
late certain interests, but other interests belong to the federal government).
220. Id. at 1.
221. Id. at 14.
222. See supra notes 126–36 and accompanying text (discussing several states’ differing  regu- R
latory approaches).  States may choose to mandate informed consent, control advertising, and
regulate in almost any way they see fit.  Meyer, supra note 125, at 14. R
223. Meyer, supra note 125, at 5. R
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Care Act and its essential benefits requirements.224  Further, just be-
cause the FCSRCA does not authorize supervisory regulations under
its authority, does not mean that Congress cannot take other legisla-
tive actions to regulate ART.
3. Opposition from Industry and Religious Groups
Two strong parties with very separate agendas are typically strong
opponents to most laws concerning ART.  The first, religious persons
or groups with strong pro-life beliefs, strongly oppose the use of em-
bryonic stem cells for research use because the procedures destroy the
embryos.225  These groups believe that human life, or at least its po-
tential, begins at conception; accordingly, the destruction of embryos
is the destruction of human life.226  These core beliefs may justify their
opposition to IVF and other ART treatments not only because of the
traditional ethical objections to creating sacred human life, but be-
cause excess embryos taken for IVF may be destroyed if not handled
properly or if a recipient does not wish for others to use her em-
bryos.227  This religious opposition is likely fueled by the strong emo-
tions attached to the abortion debate.228  Unfortunately, any
regulations short of bans on IVF or embryo destruction would likely
be opposed by these groups.229  Thus, it is likely that any regulations
designed to protect egg donors would experience this opposition.230
The second group likely opposed to broader supervision and regula-
tion of ART is that of parties directly involved in the ART industry,
although they are likely opposed for different reasons than the relig-
ious groups.231  Unlike the first group, industry parties typically op-
pose regulations controlling the use of ART or stem cell research.232
224. Daar, supra note 85, at 321–24; Swendiman, supra note 158, at 6–15; see supra notes R
153–56 and accompanying text. R
225. See Robertson, supra note 2, at 697–98. R
226. Specifically, the “majority of the Religious Right views an embryo as a living human
being, and thus . . .the destruction of embryos [is] murder.”  Bercovici, supra note 3, at 198. R
227. See Robertson, supra note 2, at 697–98. R
228. Helen M. Alvare´, The Case for Regulating Collaborative Reproduction: A Children’s
Rights Perspective, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 32–33 (2003); Bercovici, supra note 3, at 193; Jody R
Lynee´ Madeira, Woman Scorned?: Resurrecting Infertile Women’s Decision-making Autonomy,
71 MD. L. REV. 339, 342 n. 9 (2012); Note, Guiding Regulatory Reform in Reproduction and
Genetics, 120 HARV. L. REV. 574, 582–84 (2006).
229. John A. Robertson, Conflicting Interests in Reproductive Autonomy and Their Impact on
New Technologies: The Personal Right Privacy, Property, or Child?: Assisting Reproduction,
Choosing Genes, and the Scope of Reproductive Freedom, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1490, 1494–95
(2008).
230. Id. at 1490; Marvin, supra note 3, at 142; Note, supra note 228, at 583. R
231. Reddix-Smalls, supra note 67, at 672–73; Preisler, supra note 3, at 225. R
232. Preisler, supra note 3, at 225. R
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The most influential groups are the most organized, such as the pro-
fessional associations ASRM and SART,233 or the most financially
powerful, like fertility clinics and pharmaceutical companies who
manufacture fertility drugs and hormone stimulation.234  Both profes-
sional societies and private industry parties want to ensure that the
practice of ART is permitted in the United States and not unduly reg-
ulated, with ASRM seeking some regulations while businesses in-
volved in ART prefer looser regulations.235  There are also smaller
business interests, like egg brokers, clinics, and physicians performing
ART or stem cell research, who also desire a generally unregulated
industry.236
Although the changes suggested by this Comment could face oppo-
sition by both groups, these proposals are relatively modest.  For one,
religious groups typically oppose any legislation concerning ART
short of definitive bans, and industry parties will fight any regulations
that attempt to restrict or hinder their practice.  Although industry
parties may object to the increased oversight, the expansion of insur-
ance will likely increase their customer base and, accordingly, attract
their support.
4. Consequences of Over-Regulation
A less direct barrier to regulating ART is the fear of consequences
of over-regulation, which includes restricted access to ART, the sti-
fling of industry innovation and restriction of commerce, and the crea-
tion of a black market for eggs and reproductive tourism.  These
consequences have been felt by some of the countries that regulate
ART more actively than the United States, particularly the United
Kingdom.237  After the United Kingdom limited compensation to di-
rect costs incurred and created a national donor registry that effec-
tively eliminated donor anonymity, it experienced heavy reduction in
the supply of egg donor.238  The number of women who donated
dropped significantly to the point where there is currently a four-year
233. ASRM is not opposed to all legislation and typically advocates for certain laws.  It also is
conscious of consequences of over regulation and wants to ensure that the practice of ART can
still freely operate within the bounds of medical guidelines. See OVERSIGHT OF ART, supra note
173, at 11. R
234. Reddix-Smalls, supra note 67, at 672. R
235. Jiminez, supra note 98, at 395; Reddix-Smalls, supra note 67 at 672–77. R
236. See Krawiec, supra note 95, at 213–14. R
237. Levine, supra note 88, at 27. R
238. Id. at 25.
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waiting list to obtain donor eggs.239  This has lead to the emergence of
black markets for donor eggs and increased reproductive tourism.240
The United Kingdom’s decreased supply of donor eggs caused by its
bans on compensation and anonymity resulted in recipients seeking
more affordable treatments and eggs outside of regulatory oversight,
thus being able to offer any compensation necessary to obtain the do-
nor eggs they want.241  This is clearly troublesome because it leads to
ART being performed outside regulated facilities242 or even outside
the country to escape the prohibitory laws.243  This concept of going to
different countries or jurisdictions to obtain cheaper or otherwise un-
available ART treatments is known as reproductive tourism, and it
has been a particular issue within European countries.244
Although the changes proposed by this Comment will expand regu-
lation and oversight beyond its current status, they are far from com-
plete bans on compensation or anonymity.  Further, although
enforceable limits to compensation may act to “price out” some do-
nors who demand a greater reimbursement for their time and eggs,
the majority of donors are paid well within the current limits sug-
gested by ASRM.  And, even if the expanded reporting collects some
information on donors, it does not require the disclosure of a donor’s
identity to the offspring created from their eggs, nor any other person-
ally identifying information.
There are several constitutional concerns related to the feared ef-
fects of over-regulation detailed supra.245  One concern is that of re-
productive rights and equal protection and treatment of citizens.246
239. Id. at 23 (citing Sam Lister, Five-Year Waits in IVF Postcode Lottery, TIMES (UK NEWS),
May 24, 2005, http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/uk/article1933345.ece.)
240. Id. at 25.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Levine, supra note 88, at 25. R
244. What Is Reproductive Tourism?, LA JOLLA IVF (Apr. 13, 2012), http://www.lajollaivf
.com/what-is-reproductive-tourism/.
245. Although a detailed analysis of these potential challenges goes well beyond the scope of
this Comment and may not all concern egg donors, the basic principles are still relevant.  Al-
though not particularly strong arguments, bans on donor compensation could be challenged as
infringing ones’ economic liberties, Daar, supra note 85, but this would likely survive constitu- R
tional challenges since various state laws ban compensation for all bodily substances except for
sperm, eggs, and hair. See generally Baum, supra note 26, at 126 n.54 (examining the various R
state laws). The ART industry as a whole may have a stronger economic argument against over-
regulation due to its financial stake in the billion dollar industry.  Preisler, supra note 3, at 225; R
Reddix-Smalls, supra note 67, at 672; 681–88.  Similarly, bans on donor anonymity could raise R
rather weak claims regarding privacy rights, but this would likely only be a strong argument from
those who have relied on their anonymity in making the donation.  Sauer, supra note 2, at R
947–50.
246. Meyer, supra note 125, at 2–3, 7. R
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The U.S. Supreme Court has identified certain procreative rights, al-
though they are rather limited.247  These rights have certainly not
been extended access to ART, but when tied to concerns for the equal
treatment of persons, limiting access to some groups but not others
could on infringe certain individual rights.248  Even though a nation-
wide ban of ART may be vulnerable to challenges as limiting access to
procreation, laws preventing or limiting access to ART by same-sex
couples or persons of a particular race would face even stronger chal-
lenges.249  Unequal access or imbalanced use of certain offspring traits
also raises ethical eugenics concerns.250
Although states can set restrictions on who may obtain insurance
for ART treatments, the general mandate proposed in this Comment
would not differentiate or set requirements for insurance coverage.
Thus, although individual utilization of insurance expansion by indi-
vidual states could be restricted to certain gender and relationship
qualifications, the mandate this Comment proposed is neutral.
Because the reforms proposed by this Comment avoid the pitfalls
related to other alternative regulations and those related to regulating
ART generally, the reforms proposed by this Comment can operate to
help safeguard egg donors from potentially unethical treatment and
still have a chance to be implemented.
V. CONCLUSION
It is important to be mindful of the conflicting interests and forces
involved in proposing any ART regulation.  One of the strongest in-
terests is that of the clinics, pharmaceutical companies, and third par-
ties involved in the ART industry whose million dollars of annual
revenues likely generate strong lobbying interest.  Another interest is
that of the millions of recipients who are willing to pay thousands of
dollars to become pregnant with or without donor eggs.251
247. See id. at 3–6.
248. See Valarie Blake, It’s an ART not a Science: State-Mandated Insurance Coverage of As-
sisted Reproductive Technologies and Legal Implications for Gay and Unmarried Persons, 12
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 651, 678 (2011) (arguing that “implicit exclusion of gay, unmarried, and
medico-structurally infertile persons from state-mandated insurance coverage of ART” would
raise legal challenges). This is particularly relevant regarding access for same-sex couples who
inherently require one donor gamete. Id. And, while the U.S. Supreme Court has not explicitly
identified homosexuals as a protected class, any laws that specifically restrict access to same-sex
couples but grant it for heterosexual couples could be extremely vulnerable to constitutional
attacks.  Id.
249. Id.
250. See Krawiec, supra note 95, at 219. R
251. See Baum, supra note 26, at 149. R
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It may be best to heed the ASRM’s advice and avoid passing strict
standards at the federal level.252  This would respect the interests of
certain groups opposed to ART and preserve the benefits cited of the
laboratory of the states as well as federalism principles of preserving
the regulation of medicine to the states.  It would also be preferable to
fit the new regulatory scheme within existing structures and resources
to reduce costs and quell political opposition to funding ART.
Tying insurance reimbursement for infertility services to the regula-
tions that are implemented supra would modify the existing financial
incentives to ensure professional conduct and proper donor treatment
rather than achieving high pregnancy success rates and the negative
consequences produced by these goals.253  The ART industry would
be free to operate in its private free-market nature, and high preg-
nancy success rates would still be a goal, but compliance with ex-
panded regulations and according eligibility for insurance coverage
would be an equally important factor for potential recipi-
ent–consumers.254  Furthermore, several sources indicate that insur-
ance coverage alone improves professional conduct and deters
unprofessional acts.255  Insurance coverage may force physicians to
make more medically appropriate judgments.256  Switching a clinic’s
end goal of achieving high pregnancy success rates to strict adherence
of the expanded regulations listed supra would likely create better
protections for egg donors.257  Monitoring compliance would be rather
simple for insurance companies within the current regulatory struc-
ture because they could easily see which clinics are reporting to the
252. See OVERSIGHT OF ART, supra note 173, at 11. R
253. See supra notes 146–209 and accompanying text (arguing that federal action is necessary R
to incentivize states into regulating egg donation more closely, offering potential forms of super-
vision that could aid in counteracting the prorecipient biases through expanded insurance).
254. See generally Alberta, supra note 42 (discussing the risks to both parties involved in an R
IVF procedure and the need for regulation in light of these concerns).
255. See OVERSIGHT OF ART, supra note 173, at 10–11 (citing Tarun Jian et al., Insurance R
Coverage and Outcomes of In Vitro Fertilization, 347 N. ENG. J. MED. 661 (2002); Soc’y for
Assisted Reprod. Tech. & the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Assisted Reproductive Technology in
the United States: 1999 Results Generated from the American Society for Assisted Reproductive
Technology Registry, 78 FERTILITY & STERILITY 918 (2002)).
256. See id. at 10.
257. Supra notes 182–201 and accompanying text. R
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CDC258 and which are in compliance with either state or professional
standards.
Joseph Gregorio*
258. See generally 2012 CLINIC SUCCESS RATES REPORT, supra note 18, at app. C, 535–576 R
(listing the reporting clinics as of 2013); Daar, supra note 85, at 323–24; supra notes 202–09 and R
accompanying text.
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